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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to discuss, in an informal way,
some of the challenging research opportunities that arise in
the analysis and synthesis of Command, Control, and
Communications (C3 ) systems. It is concluded that significant
advances in the theory of distributed decision theory under
dynamic uncertainty are necessary to properly understand and
synthesize complex military C3 systems, and to advance the
state-of-the-art.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine certain generic problems
of military Command, Control and Communications (C 3 ) systems from the
viewpoint of modern systems engineering and to suggest research avenues
that appear to be promising in advancing the state-of-the-art for C
processes.
The field of Command and Control has received a lot of attention
in the past few years (see ref. t2] for a recent collection of views on the
subject by several high level DOD and industrial contributors). The
reason for this flurry of interest appears to be due to several factors:
(1) There seems to be some dissatisfaction with C3 related
procurements. To a certain degree this dissatisfaction may stem
from unrealistic expectations on the part of the military user
community on potential performance. There have been several com-
ments voiced that the hardware specifications and system-wide
performance were decided by engineers that are not aware of the
"true" needs of operational commanders.
(2) There is an increasing awareness that it is very difficult to
arrive at rational design specifications for the performance of
a C3 system under a variety of peacetime, crisis-management, and
war conditions. The integration of specifications for individual
hardware components into a system-wide performance index is a very
complex task, and there does not exist a systematic methodology to
aid the systems engineer to carry out the necessary cost-performance-
reliability tradeoffs.
(3) The increasing range, speed, and accuracy of sophisticated weapons
systems enlarge the volume of responsibility of task force commanders,
thus necessitating an increased geographical dispersion of the
commanders assets.
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(4) The increased speed of weapons systems have reduced the time
available for making tactical decisions by human decision
makers. This requires an ever increasing use of automation at
all levels.
(5) Centralized command posts are vulnerable to enemy attack, This
necessitates the geographical distribution of the command hierarchy,
and requires increased tactical communication among command centers
for force coordination.
(6) The necessary secure and reliable communications links represent
a very vulnerable component of the C3 system. Modern electronic
warfare (EW) disrupts communications through jamming during the time
that tactical communications are needed most for force coordination.
Similar communications constraints can occur due to environmental
conditions (terrain, weather, etc.). High power communications are
also undesirable because the emitted electromagnetic energy can be
detected by enemy sensors, such as high-frequency direction finders
(HFDF), and can be used my missiles that home-in using the radiation
energy (ARM).
(7) Active, high signal-to-noise ratio sensors, such as radar, although
excellent in the surveillance problem suffer from similar electro-
magnetic detection problems. Passive sensors are less vulnerable,
but they do not provide accurate information, unless they are
internetted with a high-bandwidth communications network.
The above remarks indicate some of the complex systems engineering issues
that have to be addressed in C processes. It should be self-evident that
one deals with very complex large-scale distributed estimation and decision
processes with a high degree of uncertainty due to environmental variables
and enemy actions., Clearly, if a relevant set of theories and tools are
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developed for military C3 systems, then these results would be applicable
to similar problems arising in the civilian sector (power systems, trans-
portation systems, etc.) which operate in a less stressful and less hostile
environment.
The function of the C system is to provide relevant, accurate, and
timely information to the commanders so that they can make correct decisions
regarding the deployment and movement of their forces and resources, carry
out the necessary resource allocations, and achieve the objectives assigned
to them. To accomplish their missions the commanders must establish a
functional organizational structure that can deal effectively with rapidly
changing tactical situations. The necessary organizational structure is very
much dependent upon sensors, communications, and weapons technology. This
is a key point to keep in mind. For example, in the absence of tactical
communications the organizational structure must be such that each human
decision maker can operate in an open-loop manner (or according to doctrine
in military language). Clearly, a different organizational structure will
be more effective if communications are available, so that force and resource
coordination can be carried out in real time (closed loop command and control).
The distributed nature of the sensors and the distributed nature of
human decision makers obviously interact with the architecture of the C3
system, It is unrealistic to expect that all relevant information is trans-
mitted in a timely manner to all decision makers; this would consume valuable
(and vulnerable) communications resources and require a large time-delay.
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Even if such "global" information could be transmitted to all human
decision makers, they would be "swamped" with information, and they
would be unable to use it effectively under the stringent time cons-
traints that commanders operate in a stressful tactical engagment.
The above remarks illustrate the fascinating system-theoretic issues
that arise in military command and control. These problems suggest new
and unexplored avenues for theoretical research in modern systems,
estimation, and control theory. The problems are clearly of the large-
scale system variety, but quite different from those considered in the
system-theoretic literature.
2. HUMAN DECISION ASPECTS
In this paper, the tactical aspects of command and control will be
discussed leaving aside the strategic and planning issues; these are
extremely important and quite often the success of a mission will crucially
depend upon careful planning, resource allocation and logistic support.
These set up some of the goals and constraints that a commander must operate
under in any given tactical situation,
3
The purpose of a C system is to provide the necessary information to
a team of human decision makers so that they can carry out the mission
assigned to them,
It is very important to appreciate that tactical decisions in a modern
warfare environment are carried out by a team of commanders, rather than by
a single commander. The reason for this is obvious. Weapons technology has
progressed to the point that no single human decision maker can be an
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expert on all offensive and defensive options; even if he were, there
would be no time to absorb all information and execute all decisions.
To be sure, there is and there always will be the traditional military
command hierarchy; however, from a functional point of view, modern
warfare requires a much more fluid structure as far as tactical decision
making is concerned,
To illustrate this concept, let us consider a naval battle group
or task force consisting of at least one aircraft carrier together with
several other platforms (cruisers, destroyers, etc.) and support vessels.
Such a task force is capable of conducting simultaneously anti-submarine
warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW), and anti-surface warfare (ASUW) in
the sense that it possesses both the sensor and weapons resources, distri-
buted among the platforms, to engage simultaneously submarines, aircraft,
ships and missiles (which can be launched from submarines, airplanes, and
ships as well as land bases). In order for the task force to be successful
in such a complex engagement requires the coordinated decision making of
several commanders, which may not necessarily be colocated. The U.S. Pacific
Fleet has adopted the concept of Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) who
oversees the actions of an ASW Commander (ASWC), an AAW Commander (AAWC),
and an ASUW Commander (ASUWC). Each of the three subordinate commanders has
a functional responsibility for defensive and offensive decision and actions
in his area of "expertise". Interestingly enough the CWC "governs by
negation;" the CWC monitors the decisions of the ASWC, AAWC, and ASUWC and
he only intervenes when either an inappropriate (in his mind) decision is
contemplated or when there is obvious need to resolve conflicts related to
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resource allocation. Such resource allocation conflicts may arise due to
the fact that the relative location of the platforms in the task force
can have a significant impact upon the capability of the task force to
conduct ASW or AAW, especially since certain platforms have significant
capability in carrying out ASW, AAW, ASUW as well as electronic warfare (EW)
missions simultaneously. Another type of resource allocation conflict
arises in the allocation of air resources to ASW, AAW, and ASUW.
The three main commanders (ASWC, AAWC, ASUWC) are those that issue
orders. However, their actions are influenced by inputs of coordinators
(such as the screen coordinator, electronic warfare coordinator, helicopter
coordinator etc.) who have responsibility for a certain function associated
with resources controlled by the commanders (ASWC, AAWC, and ASUWC). These
coordinators monitor the status of the specific problem assigned to them and
provide recommendations to the commanders on what to do. Interestingly
enough one can abstract the objectives of the coordinators in terms of specific
detection, survival, deception, and kill probabilities in their specific area
of responsibility. Also note that the coordinators do not serve necessarily
as staff to one of the commanders; rather they assess situations and generate
recommendations that may involve the assets of more than one commander,
The above discussion illustrates that although there is a clear cut
command hierarchy (e.g. admiral, captain, etc.), the team-decision mechanism
in a tactical situation is not hierarchical in nature (where the word
hierarchical is used in the strict system theoretic context).
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Such team coordination issues are not unique to the Navy. Even
more complex tactical coordination issues arise when one consider a land
warfare scenario which involves the coordinated actions of both Air Force
and Army assets. In this case the problem of tactical coordination are
further complicated by the existence of traditional chains of command between
two services as well as necessary coordination with Allied ground and air
assets, I2], I3].
Thus, if one examines tactical warfare one must immediately come to
grips with problems of distributed decision making by teams of expert
commanders, For maximum effectiveness the resources available must be
coordinated in time and in space. The complexity of the problem requires
a division of responsibility and a certain autonomy in the decision making
process of an individual commander. On the other hand, the commanders must
communicate selectively for best resource utilization; communications may
be subject to constraints especially when the commanders are geographically
distributed to decrease vulnerability. It is precisely the function of the
C3 system to provide to each commander the right information at the right time
so that he can accomplish the mission assigned to him, and to allow for the
necessary coordination of the team resources and decisions.
The most important information that a commander needs is the location!
velocity, and identity of his own, the enemy's and neutral objects. Past
motion history is often important in deducing the enemy intentions. Fuel
and weapons availability related to one's own assets is obviously also
important. Such information must be gathered by the C surveillance system.
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It is important to stress that in a tactical situation surveillance and
tracking information can be collected by a variety of sensors. Often the
sensor measurements must be "fused", i.e. correlated with each other so
as to provide an accurate situation estimate (some sensors such as radar
provide very good position information but not identity; others, such as
HFDF can provide some identity information but poor position accuracy).
Because the sensors are geographically distributed there is a significant
time delay before an accurate situation plot can be generated and trans-
mitted to the commanders.
In a tactical situation each commander is presented with a view
of the "state of the world" which he knows can be inaccurate and not
necessarily very timely. Nonetheless, on the basis of this incomplete
information each commander must make decisions consistent with the cons-
traints imposed by the preplanned actions. Typical decisions involve:
(a) Control of surveillance resources (e.g. turn on a radar,
launch a reconnaissance aircraft, etc.) to gather more
information or clarify ambiguous information.
(b) Control of electromagnetic radiation (e.g. communicate
or not, jamming strategies, etc.),
(c) Control of resources (e.g. relative position of ships,
aircraft, tanks, troops, etc. and control of their
movements).
(d) Assignment of weapons to targets (e.g. sortie planning by
deciding what aircraft, from what bases, should be armed
with what weapons, to attack what targets or other objects
of military value).
(e) Weapons control.
These decisions are always made by human commanders. Some of the
decisions are strategic in nature, i.e. they are the outcome of extensive
preparation and planning. In a system-theoretic context the strategic
decisions and planning are roughly equivalent to the establishment of
desired open-loop controls and trajectories, and one can argue that such
strategic or command decisions are the outcome of a static or dynamic
deterministic optimization problem. In this phase, intelligence information
is crucial. In the planning phase many details are not taken into account.
Uncertainty is usually handled by planning in detail alternate options;
specific and unambiguous objectives and directives are commanded for exe-
cution and implementation by the appropriate commanders. Generally [51,
[61 subordinate commanders are told "who", "what", "where", "when" and "why".
In general, subordinate commanders are not told "how"; it is up to the sub-
ordinate commander to develop a detailed tactical plan of action to
accomplish the objective assigned to him.
It is useful, in the opinion of the author, to think of the "command"
function in C3 systems as being completely analogous to the open-loop
control concept of modern control theory. The command function effectively
specifies the reference trajectories in time and space (and alternate ones)
for the mission to be performed. Although the tactical actions will be
executed by a geographically distributed set of subordinate commanders ac-
cording to their best decisions (remember the "how" is not specified), the
availability of a global open-loop plan provides valuable open-loop
coordination among distinct units. For example, neighboring platoons in a
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land warfare scenario will know the planned location and plans of adjacent
units, as well as the time and place of close air-support operations, This
helps a platoon commander plan his own course of action by correctly allocat-
ing his own defensive and offensive resources.
The word "control" in C3 systems refers to the function that indeed
the preplanned courses of action are more or less being accomplished in a
tactical situation. In the author's opinion, the "control" function is
completely analogous to "feedback". Real-time surveillance provides the
commander with an estimate of the "state of the world"; he compares this
with the desired state associated with the command process, and real-time
decisions are made to control in real time the available resources to
correct for undesirable deviations.
The nature of real time information by the tactical surveillance
system can impact the overall decision process in different ways. A
crucial piece of'global" information is one that violates a key assumption*
under which the operational battle plans were made. This may necessitate
the implementation of alternative operational plans at the highest level.
If such a contigency were taken into account in the planning process the
alternate plans can be sent easily and rapidly to the subordinate commanders.
If, on the other hand, this contgency was not anticipated and there is no
A good example is the naval battle at Midway Island during World War II.
The Japanese plans to invade Midway were based upon the intelligence as-
sumption that the U.S. carriers were at Pearl Harbor. By breaking the
Japanese code the U.S. Naval forces knew of the intended invasion of Midway,
and Admiral Nimitz dispatched a three carrier force near Midway. The pre-
sence, location, and size of the U.S. task force did not become apparent to
the Japanese until the battle started. This may have been a deciding factor
in the battle outcome, in which the Japanese lost four of their large air-
craft carriers, and abandoned the invasion plan.
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time for drawing another set of plans (or if the communications environ-
ment does not permit transmission of the commands) the tactical situation
will become chaotic at least in the short run,
The feedback "control" function requires the real-time reallocation
of the resources of, and by, an individual commander to meet his commanded
objectives. Sometimes he can accomplish this with the resources alloted to
him; in certain cases, the situation necessitates the real-time coordina-
tion of the resources of two distinct commanders, and this obviously re-
quires tactical communications.
The above discussion illustrates the nature of the decisions that
have to be carried out by individual commanders, at different levels of
the command hierarchy. The quality of the decisions made by an individual
commander depend on the following key factors:
(a) The nature, quality, and especially timeliness of the available
information (this can be greatly influenced by a superior C sys-
tem.
(b) The rules of the engagement (these act as constraints upon the
commander's decision process).
(c) The goals and objectives assigned to him by superior commanders
at the strategic planning phase.
(d) The commander's available resources (these again act as constraints
to his decisions).
(e) The planning horizon time.
(f) The complexity of the tactical situation vs. the time available to
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arrive at a satisfactory decision (computer decision aids for
the commander can help him to either arrive at better decisions
within a given time limit and/or complete his decisions sooner).
The overall global outcome of any engagement will clearly depend
upon the quality of the decisions of the distributed commanders.
3. SYSTEM -THEORETIC RESEARCH ISSUES
In the above section we discussed generic issues associated with the
Command and Control process. In this section we outline some relevant
research directions, from a system-theoretic viewpoint, that are necessary
to develop methodologies and theories for C3 systems.
Clearly military C3 systems fall in the category of large-scale dis-
tributed decision systems. In spite of the many advances in large-scale
estimation and control systems (see the survey paper of Sandell, et al [9])
we do not have a unified theoretical methodology for such systems.
Although C3 systems fall in the category of large scale systems, none-
theless they are characterized by certain key properties and attributes
that must be taken in account. These are:
(1) They are event-driven.
(2) The dynamics* tend to be trivial and there is not a significant
dynamic coupling among the system elements.
(3) The coupling occurs primarily at the resource allocation level
and the coordination of the resources in time and in space.
By this we mean the trajectories of aircraft, ships, missiles, tanks, etc.
The motion of these resources does not create a dynamic coupling as in the
case with, say, large scale power systems.
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Military C3 systems are characterized by geographical dispersion and phenomena
that involve multiple time scales (for example, ASW operations are slow as
compared to AAW operations), This spatial and temporal decomposition natural-
ly leads to command distribution without the nned for extensive coordination
in many cases.
From a technical point of view, the distributed detection and estima-
tion problems that arise in the surveillance area and in the sensor tasking
area, appear to be those that are most amenable to analytical treatment.
Unified theoretical and algorithmic approches are needed in the generic
problem of multiple geographically distributed sensors tracking multiple
geographically distributed objects, the networking of these sensors, the
necessary istributed data base management issues, and the communications
requirements. A recent paper [7] discusses some of the issues in the C
surveillance functions, so no more comments on that topic will be given
here.
The greatest challenge by far is to understand the interactions of a
distributed team of human decision makers with the mechanistic and electronic
components of the C3 system. Fundamental understanding is required of the
proper functional organizational structure of human commanders with the
organization and architecture of the underlying C system. It should be
stressed that technological advances in the mechanistic and electronic
components of the C system (weapons, sensors, computers, communications, etc)
will have a definite impact upon the organizational structure of the commanders,
including their geographical distribution to reduce the vulnerability of
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centralized command and control centers. Tactical coordination will
increase as multi-purpose platforms (ships, aircraft, etc), capable of
performing simultaneously many functions (e.g. ASW, AAW, ASUW, EW), be-
come increasingly available,
One cannot avoid facing squarely the issue that we must develop
normative mathematical models for individual decision making. One ap-
proach that is under consideration [101 is to attempt to model the
decisions a well-trained expert human commander as the output of a con-
strained optimization (static or dynamic) problem, In this formulation,
the constraints on the optimization problem are related to the informa-
tion available to the commander, the rules of engagement, the assigned
resources, the desired mission, the planning horizon, and time-deadlines.
The greatest problem area is to quantify the objective function used by
the human consistent with his limitations in problem solving. A key
constraint that must be included in the problem formulation is the limit-
ations of human short-term memory (STM) (see the discussion by Simon on
cognitive simulation in [111). Information that is being processed by
the central nervous system has to be held in STM, which represents a memory
of notoriously short term capacity; human performance on congitive tasks
is dramatically sensitive to the limits of STM. On the other hand, an
experienced well-trained expert has stored a tremendous amount of informa-
tion in long term memory (LTM). As Simon points out [11], "the accumulation
of experience may allow humans to behave in ways that are very nearly optimal
in situations to which their experience is pertinent, but will be of little
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help when genuinely novel situations are presented", It may very well be






to properly take into account the risk-taking and risk-aversion character-
istics of human decision making (see the discussion by Wohl [3] and [11],
[12], and [13]).
Normative models for humans are not new in control theory. There
have been several successful (and validated) models of human acting as a
controller [8], [14]. Recently, these normative models have been extended
to the case of a single decision maker having to accomplish a multiplicity
of dynamic tasks under time deadline constraints, [8]; these results are
very encouraging, not only because there is good agreement between the
theoretical predictions of the normative optimal decision model for the
human and the experimental data, but also because they demonstrate that
for rapid tactical like problems with significant uncertainty the planning
horizon of the human tends to be short. This is consistent with the limit-
ations of human short-term memory, discusses above, which precludes the
human from solving in his head stochastic dynamic programming problems with
long planning horizons'
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Needless to say, the very issue of developing normative models for
human decision makers, and especially military commanders, is a very
controversial one. Assuming for the time being that such models can
be developed and validated, they can be used to represent the most
probable decision of an ensemble of well trained human commanders in the
same area of expertise, together with a measure of variability (e.g. stand-
ard deviations). Thus, such normative models cannot be used to model any
particular commander. Also, it is unlikely that such normative models can
provide us with cules on how "great military geniuses" think.
One can engage in endless discussions on modeling human decision
making. It is the opinion of the author that such arguments, although
intellectually interesting, have little to do with the problem of properly
designing the architecture of a C3 system that is intended to support the
decisions of many commanders. If we do develop adequate normative models,
these will be very useful in carrying out engineering and cost/effectiveness
tradeoffs on the C system hardware and architectures. They can also be
very useful in carrying out computer aided war games, in which the functions
of low-level subordinate commanders are replaced by computer algorithms,
thus allowing the war game to be played realistically at a global level with
many fewer human resources. This would result in significant savings. (A
complex Naval war game, of the type played at the Naval War College in Newport,
R.I. may involve 150 players; the computer is primarily used for bookkeeping
purposes.)
Much needed research is needed to combine such normative models of
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individual commanders into a distributed team decision model. This will
allow the study of alternate organizational structures in conjunction with
the architecture of the C3 system, as a function of the tactical situation.
Very little military doctrine has been developed in defining the command
and organizational structure best suited to coordinate forces with a signi-
ficant content of multipurpose platforms. If a relevant command organiza-
tion theory could be developed, then it would be very useful in defining
suitable adaptive changes in command following an initial engagement in
which some resources, including those associated with the C system, were
destroyed. It would also be useful for counter-C studies, by isolating
most vulnerable interfaces between the command organizational structure
and the C3 components. From a system-theoretic viewpoint very little has
been done along these lines. The methodology in [15] (which deals with
issues of team decision making by a distributed set of "expert" decision
makers, each with a limited model of the world) could be a useful first
step in this class of complex problems.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper a brief discussion of some generic decision problems in
military command and control organizations was presented. The need for
normative models of both individual and team decision processes was dis-
cussed, so that one can understand how to most effectively structure the
human organizational command and control structure in unison with the
architecture of the C system so as to best support the decisions of the
commanders.
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